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For 25 years, Washington and New Delhi took great pride in forging one of the world’s most dynamic, fruitful strategic partnerships in the post–Cold War period. Now, with trust badly frayed over oil, tariffs, and new global equilibria, that camaraderie has hit one of its lowest ebbs in years.

Evan Feigenbaum, South Asia expert at the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, summed up bluntly the outlook for the relationship. “We’re in a situation in the U.S.-India relationship where the premises and assumptions of the last 25 years — that everybody worked very hard to build, including the president in his first term — have just come completely unraveled. The trust is gone,” he said.

The precipitating event, at least as far as New Delhi is concerned, was President Donald Trump’s decision to place sweeping tariffs on Indian goods earlier this year in response to Delhi’s continued purchases of Russian crude despite the war in Ukraine. That tariff, which began at 25 percent and is set to increase to 50 percent on August 27, seems to have failed in its stated objective to drive New Delhi to curb its buying of Russian oil. Instead, it seems to have pushed India closer to Moscow and Beijing.

India’s national security adviser visited Moscow last month, Foreign Minister Subrahmanyam Jaishankar held high-level talks there in June, and Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi just wrapped up a visit to New Delhi. Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi is expected to visit China next month, the first such trip in more than seven years, and Russian President Vladimir Putin is expected to welcome him in Moscow before the end of the year. The moves have not been empty symbolism: Russian state oil firm Rosneft has signed an agreement with Indian refiners to deliver 2 million metric tons of crude in September.

The decision has been controversial even within India, as public opinion hardens against what is seen as a U.S. attempt to dictate sovereign foreign policy choices. “They’re signaling very clearly that they view that as interference in India’s foreign policy, and they are not going to put up with it,” Feigenbaum explained.

Even after an initial reluctance in the early days of the war, state-run refiners signed agreements to resume buying Russian oil after discounts of six to seven percent. That had the effect of doubling Russia’s share of India’s total oil imports to 35 percent, up from a mere 0.2 percent before the Ukraine war. Russia has since moved to sweeten the deal, with Deputy Prime Minister Denis Manturov saying it would continue to ship crude and oil products to India, along with thermal and coking coal. “There is potential for the export of Russian LNG,” he added.

Domestic Politics

In some respects, the tariffs are not the only catalyst: India has been moving to ease tensions with China, which became increasingly assertive along the countries’ border, for nearly a year before Trump’s move. “We’ve seen indications for almost a year of India wanting to ease tensions with China and strengthen relations, mainly for economic reasons. But the Trump administration’s policies have made India want to move even more quickly,” said Michael Kugelman, a South Asia analyst at the Washington-based Wilson Center.

In some respects, those moves may be performative, a show of diplomatic muscle from a new government in power. In others, such as defense trade, the moves have far more practical implications, Feigenbaum said: “India is going to double down on some aspects of its economic and defense relationship with Russia — and those parts are not performative.”

India had already begun to diversify its defense imports from Russian systems to those from the U.S., France, and Israel before the Ukraine war. But once the Kremlin invaded, energy trade with Moscow has been surging. Kugelman characterized it as part of a larger effort on the part of the Modi government to show that “the U.S. can’t be trusted, whereas Russia can — because Russia is always going to be there for India no matter what.”

At the same time, Modi has capitalized on the moment to burnish his credentials at home as a defender of the country’s independence from Western hegemony. He has emphasized his desire to protect the livelihoods of Indian farmers, small businesses, and young workers — a particularly potent domestic message. Kugelman noted that India had already made concessions to Washington, including on tariff reductions and the repatriation of migrant workers, before the war in Ukraine. “Because of those concessions, India needs to be careful about signaling further willingness to bend. This is one reason there was no trade deal — Modi put his foot down,” he said.

In the U.S., there is a growing sense of exasperation. Peter Navarro, former White House trade adviser, wrote in the Financial Times, “India’s decision to buy Russian oil is not only opportunistic, it is deeply corrosive to our relationship. Tariffs are therefore necessary to hit India where it hurts — its access to U.S. markets — even as it seeks to cut off the financial lifeline it has extended to Russia’s war effort.”

The move also stands in sharp contrast with earlier triumphs of the relationship, such as the 2008 U.S.-India civil nuclear deal, in which Washington agreed to sell India American fuel and technology, despite its non-signatory status to the Non-Proliferation Treaty. At the time, the U.S. and India managed to compartmentalize their differences in order to avoid deeper issues derailing progress.